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Abstract
In this work we study the problem of tax evasion on a fully-connected population.
For this purpose, we consider that the agents may be in three different states,
namely honest tax payers, tax evaders and undecided, that are individuals in an
intermediate class among honests and evaders. Every individual can change his/her
state following a kinetic exchange opinion dynamics, where the agents interact by
pairs with competitive negative (with probability q) and positive (with probability
1 − q) couplings, representing agreement/disagreement between pairs of agents. In
addition, we consider the punishment rules of the Zaklan econophysics model, for
which there is a probability pa of an audit each agent is subject to in every period
and a length of time k detected tax evaders remain honest. Our results suggest
that below the critical point qc = 1/4 of the opinion dynamics the compliance is
high, and the punishment rules have a small effect in the population. On the other
hand, for q > qc the tax evasion can be considerably reduced by the enforcement
mechanism. We also discuss the impact of the presence of the undecided agents in
the evolution of the system.
Keywords: Dynamics of social systems, Collective phenomena, Computer sim-
ulations
1 Introduction
In the recent years, the statistical physics techniques have been success-
fully applied in the description of socioeconomic phenomena. Among the stud-
ied problems we can cite opinion dynamics, language evolution, biological ag-
ing, dynamics of stock markets, earthquakes and many others [1,2,3,4]. These
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interdisciplinary topics are usually treated by means of computer simulations
of agent-based models, which allow us to understand the emergence of collec-
tive phenomena in those systems.
A challenging interdisciplinary subject is tax evasion dynamics, which is an
interesting practical topic to be studied because tax evasion remains to be
a major predicament facing governments [5,6,7]. Models of tax evasion were
firstly studied by economists [8,9,10,11,12], and more recently physicists be-
came also interested in the subject [13,14,15,16,17,18] (for recent reviews, see
[5,6]). Experimental evidence provided by Gachter suggests that tax payers
tend to condition their decision regarding whether to pay taxes or not on
the tax evasion decision of the members of their group [8]. In addition, Frey
and Torgler also provide empirical evidence on the relevance of conditional
cooperation for tax morale [9]. Based on these ideas, Zaklan et al. recently
proposed a model that has been attracted attention [13]. In the so-called Za-
klan model, the dynamics of tax payers and tax evaders is analyzed by means
of the two-dimensional Ising model at a given temperature T . In this model,
each agent i may be in one of two possible states, namely si = +1 (honest)
or si = −1 (cheater or tax evader). A transition si → −si (or a spin flip)
is controlled by the “social temperature” T and also depends on the nearest
neighbors’ states of the agent (or spin) at site i. Thus, for low temperatures
few spin flips occur and for high temperatures many spin flips occur. In other
words, tax evaders have the greatest influence to turn honest citizens into tax
evaders if they constitute a majority in the respective neighborhood. In addi-
tion, some punishment rules are applied: there is a probability pa of an audit
each agent is subject to in every period and a length of time k detected tax
evaders remain honest [13]. In another work, the dynamics of the model was
also controlled by another two-state model, namely the majority-vote model
with noise [19], where the noise q plays the role of the temperature. In this
case, similar results were found [16], suggesting that the results of the Zaklan
model are robust.
In this work we study the tax evasion dynamics by means of a three-state
agent-based model. The agents interact by pairs considering kinetic exchanges
of their states, in a way that the pairwise couplings may be positive of negative.
In addition, we apply the punishment rules of the Zaklan econophysics model.
Our results suggest that above the critical point of the opinion dynamics the
tax evasion can be considerably reduced by the enforcement rules. On the other
hand, below the critical point the compliance is high, and the punishment rules
have a small impact on the evasion.
This work is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the microscopic
rules that define the model, and the numerical results are discussed in Section
3. Finally, our conclusions are presented in Section 4.
2
2 Model
Our model is based on a kinetic exchange opinion model [20]. A popu-
lation of N agents is defined on a fully-connected graph, i.e., each agent can
interact with all others. In opposition to what occurs in the Zaklan model [13],
for which the dynamics is governed by the Ising model (i.e., a two-state model),
in our model each individual i (i = 1, 2, ..., N) carries one of three possible
states or attitudes at a given time step t, represented by si(t) = +1,−1 or 0.
The dynamic rules are defined following the opinion model of Ref. [20]. Each
social interaction occurs between two given agents i and j, and we considered
that j will influence i. First, this pair of agents (i, j) is randomly chosen. Then,
the state of the agent i in the next time step t + 1 will be updated according
to
si(t + 1) = sgn [si(t) + µij sj(t)] , (1)
where the sign function is defined such that sgn(0) = 0 and the interaction
strenghts {µij} are quenched random variables given by the discrete bimodal
probability distribution
F (µij) = q δ(µij + 1) + (1− q) δ(µij − 1) . (2)
Notice that we considered that each agent can in principle interact with all
other agents, i.e. there is no specific underlying topology for the structure of
the interaction network. So the model can be viewed as an infinite dimension
(or “mean field”) Zaklan model. This is an almost realistic situation thanks
to the modern social and communication networks.
First, let us elaborate upon the nature of the above-mentioned three states.
The state si = +1 represents a honest tax payer, i.e., an individual 100%
convinced of his/her honesty, who does not consider evasion. He/she is either
habitually compliant or he/she is a recent evader who has become honest as
a result of enforcement efforts or social norms. On the other hand, the state
si = −1 represents a cheater, i.e, an individual who is an evading tax payer.
Whether a tax payer continues to evade depends on both enforcement and the
effect of social interactions.
Those two classes correspond to the ±1 states of the standard Zaklan model
[13]. In addition, we have considered a third state, si = 0, which can be
interpreted as an undecided individual. However, notice that the above rules
of the opinion dynamics [Eqs. (1) and (2)] impose that for an agent to shift
from state s = +1 to s = −1 or vice-versa it must to pass by the intermediate
undecided state s = 0 [20]. Thus, an agent that is currently at the state s = 0
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was a honest tax payer (s = +1) or a tax evader (s = −1) before. In the
first case, the individual is a honest tax payer and, due to social interactions,
he/she becomes a tax payer who is dissatisfied with the tax system, perhaps
as a result of seeing others evading without being punished. He/she is not
actively evading, but he/she might if the perceived benefits of doing so exceed
the perceived costs. For this group, evasion is an option. On the other hand,
the second possibility is that the agent is a tax evader and, due to social
interactions, he/she stops temporarily the evasion because he/she wondered
whether it is worth to evade. This agent is fickle and is not 100% convinced
of his/her honesty, and thus he/she can become a honest tax payer (s = +1)
or he/she can come back to the tax evader state (s = −1), depending on
the next interactions with his/her social contacts. The above discussion will
become more clear in the following, when we will discuss the interpretation of
the competitive interactions µij .
The pairwise couplings µij in Eq. (2) may be either negative (with probability
q) or positive (with probability 1 − q), such that q represents the fraction of
negative couplings [20,22]. The above process given by Eqs. (1) and (2) is
repeated N times, which defines one time step in the dynamics. In addition to
such basic dynamics of the model, after the N interactions we have considered
a policy makers’ tax enforcement mechanism consisting of two components,
a probability pa of an audit each person is subject to in every period and
a length of time k detected tax evaders remain honest, as considered in the
Zaklan model [13]. In other words, after the application of the above-mentioned
kinetic exchange opinion dynamics, we have considered that each tax evader
will be caught by an audit with probability pa. In this case, the individual
must remain honest for a given number k of time steps. As mentioned before,
the above rules of the opinion dynamics impose that for an agent to shift from
state si = +1 to si = −1 or vice-versa it must to pass by the intermediate
undecided state si = 0. However, this kind of hierarchy is partially broken
when we apply the enforcement rules. Indeed, if a tax evader (state si = −1)
is caught by an audit, he/she changes directly to the honest state si = +1 and
remains in this state at least during the next k time steps.
Following ref. [20], the dynamics defined by the kinetic exchange model can be
interpreted as follows. If µij is positive (with probability 1−q), there is a kind
of agreement between the agents i and j. In this case, if si(t) = 0 the agent
i is undecided and does not know what is the best choice (be honest or be
evader), and thus he/she follows the decision of j, i.e., the state of i is updated
to si(t + 1) = sj(t). If si(t) = sj(t) nothing occurs, and if si(t) = −sj(t) the
agent i will become undecided and change to state si(t + 1) = 0 in the next
time step t + 1, and he/she can become evader or a honest tax payer in a
next interaction. On the other hand, if µij is negative (with probability q),
there is a kind of disagreement or mutual disliking between the agents i and
j. In this case, if si(t) = sj(t) the agent i will become undecided and change
4
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Fig. 1. Magnetization per spin m of the kinetic exchange opinion model of Ref. [20]
as a function of the fraction q of negative interactions (i.e., where no punishment
rules were considered). The system undergoes an order-disorder phase transition
at qc = 1/4, with a paramagnetic disordered phase defined by the coexistence of
the three states s = +1,−1 and 0 with equal fractions (1/3 for each one). The
population size is N = 104, the squares are numerical results averaged over 100
independent simulations and the dashed line is just a guide to the eyes.
to si(t + 1) = 0 and and if si(t) = −sj(t) the agent i keeps his/her decision.
Finally, if si(t) = 0, the agent i does not know what is the best choice (be
honest or be evader) and due to the mentioned disliking his state is updated
to si(t + 1) = −sj(t).
As discussed in [20], the standard opinion dynamics defined by Eqs. (1) and
(2), i.e., where no punishment rules were considered, undergoes a nonequi-
librium phase transition at a critical fraction qc = 1/4. For q < qc we have a
symmetry of the extreme opinions s = ±1, i.e., one of the extreme opinions +1
or −1 dominates the system, with consensus states occurring only for q = 0,
i.e., in the absence of negative interactions. On the other hand, for q ≥ qc the
system is in a disordered “paramagnetic” phase characterized by the coexis-
tence of the three opinions, with the fraction of each opinion being 1/3. This
picture can be clearly seen in Fig. 1, where we exhibit the order parameter of
the system, i.e.,
m =
〈
1
N
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
si
∣∣∣∣∣
〉
, (3)
where 〈 ... 〉 denotes a disorder or configurational average taken at steady
states. The Eq. (3) defines the “magnetization per spin” of the system, and
the behavior of m as a function of the fraction q of negative interactions for a
population of size N = 104 agents is shown in Fig. 1.
Thus, the next step is to apply the enforcement rules of the Zaklan model [13]
to the model of Ref. [20]. The numerical results will be discussed in the next
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section.
3 Numerical Results
We applied the enforcement rules of the Zaklan model [13] to the opin-
ion dynamics model of Ref. [20]. As usually occurs in Zaklan-like models
[13,14,15,16], we have considered that initially all agents are honest, i.e., we
have si(t = 0) = +1 for all individuals i. In this case, we broke the above-
mentioned symmetry of the stationary states of the ordered phase: for q < qc
the majority of agents will be in the honest state si = +1. All the following
results are for a population of size N = 104.
Following the previous studies of the Zaklan model [13,14,15,16], one can start
analyzing the time evolution of the tax evasion, i.e., the fraction of tax evaders
(s = −1) in the population. In Fig. 2 we exhibit the tax evasion as a function
of time for two distinct values of q > qc, namely q = 0.8 [(a) and (b)] and
q = 0.5 [(c) and (d)]. In this case, as q > qc, the kinetic exchange dynamics
defined by Eqs. (1) and (2) leads the system to a disordered state with an equal
fraction of each state. In other words, considering only the opinion dynamics,
the stationary fraction of evaders should be 1/3 ≈ 33%. Thus, one can see
from Fig. 2 that if the audits are efficient (pa = 90%) the tax evasion can be
considerably reduced to ≈ 10% for k = 10 and for ≈ 3% for k = 50. In these
cases, we observe similar fluctuations of the tax evasion as the ones reported
in Zaklan models defined in regular lattice and networks [13,14,15,16]. For the
cases where we consider a realistic value of the efficient audits (pa = 5%) the
punishment is effective only if the penalty duration is high (k = 50). In this
case, the tax evasion can be reduced for values around 20%. Notice that when
we decrease the value of q the fraction of tax evaders decreases, as one can see
in Fig. 1. It can be understood as follows. As the opinion dynamics “coexists”
in the system with the punishment rules, the system does not achieve in our
model the steady states with equal fractions of the three opinions +1,−1 and
0 for q > qc. For high values of q, there are many negative couplings µij in
the population, which allows many transitions si = +1 → si = 0 and then
si = 0 → si = −1. So, it is expected that for high q the fraction of opinions
−1 is greater than in the cases of lower values of q (of course, we are talking
about the disordered phase of the kinetic exchange opinions dynamics).
As discussed above, when we decrease the value of the parameter q, the fraction
of tax evaders decreases (for q > qc). In this case, the compliance increases
when we apply the same punishments for a population with lower values of q.
Furthermore, one can conclude that for a population with a large fraction of
negative interactions, i.e., with a high disagreement among the individuals, the
compliance is low in the system, and thus it is necessary a strong enforcement
6
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Fig. 2. (Color online) Time evolution of the tax evasion for different values of the
number k of periods that a detected tax evader must remain honest for and two
distinct audit probabilities, namely pa = 0.9 (left side) and pa = 0.05 (right side).
The results are for q = 0.8 [(a) and (b)] and q = 0.5 [(c) and (d)]. Each curve is a
single realization of the dynamics for a population of size N = 104.
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Fig. 3. (Color online) Time evolution of the tax evasion for q = 0.3, different values
of the number k of periods that a detected tax evader must remain honest for and
two distinct audit probabilities, namely pa = 0.9 (a) and pa = 0.05 (b). Each curve
is a single realization of the dynamics for a population of size N = 104.
by the public policies in order to control the tax evasion, which is a realistic
feature of the model.
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Fig. 4. (Color online) Time evolution of the tax evasion for q = 0.1, different values
of the number k of periods that a detected tax evader must remain honest for and
two distinct audit probabilities, namely pa = 0.9 (a) and pa = 0.05 (b). Each curve
is a single realization of the dynamics for a population of size N = 104.
In Fig. 3 we exhibit results for q = 0.3, i.e., another value of q > qc, but now
the system is near the critical point qc = 1/4. In this case, one can see that
for a high audit probability like pa = 90% the tax evasion can be extremely
reduced in a short run [see Fig. 3 (a)], even if only a small period like k = 10
each individual is compelled to remain honest. Notice that even for pa = 5%
the application of severe punishments as k = 50 can lead the evasion to low
levels like 10%, as one can see in Fig. 3 (b).
It is shown in Fig. 4 the time series of the tax evasion for q = 0.1. In this case,
as q < qc, the kinetic exchange dynamics defined by Eqs. (1) and (2) leads the
system to an ordered state with the majority of agents in the honest (s = +1)
state, with a small fraction of tax evaders and undecided. ForN = 104 (see Fig.
1), the fraction of s = −1 individuals is ≈ 1.5%. Thus, as one can see in Fig.
4, the consideration of the punishment rules togheter with the basic dynamics
has a small effect on the tax evasion in the system, since the tendency of the
agents is to be in state s = +1 and thus there are few tax evaders to be caught
by the audits. For pa = 5% the stationary fraction of evaders is similar for
small or large k, and for pa = 90% the tax evasion decreases to ≈ 1%, with a
small difference between the cases k = 10 and k = 50. Thus, for a population
with a small fraction of negative interactions, i.e., with low disagreement (or
high agreement) among the individuals, the compliance is high in the system,
and it is not necessary a strong control by the public policies.
To better analyze the results obtained from the simulations, we exhibit in Fig.
5 the average tax evasion in the stationary states, i.e., in the long-time limit,
as a function of the audit probability pa. In Figs. 5 (a), (b) and (c) we present
the results for q = 0.1, q = 0.3 and q = 0.8, respectively, for typical values
of k. In these panels one can clearly see the above-discussed effects. Indeed,
for q < qc the tax evasion is low, but the punishment can effectively reduce
such evasion if we consider large values of k as k = 100. On the other hand,
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Fig. 5. (Color online) Average stationary tax evasion as a function of the audit
probability pa. In the panels (a), (b) and (c) the results are for q = 0.1, q = 0.3
and q = 0.8, respectively, and typical values of k. In the last panel (d) it is shown
the results for k = 10 and different fractions of negative interactions q. Each point
is averaged over 100 independent simulations for population size N = 104, and the
dashed lines are just guides to the eye.
the long-time tax evasion for the cases q > qc can be considerably decreased
by the application of public policies. In other words, the tax evasion decreases
for ≈ 33% in the absence of punishment (pa = 0) until very small percentages
like ≈ 1%. One can also see in these cases (q > qc) that for large k and
pa > 50% the compliance does not change considerably, suggesting that it is
more important to monitor individuals caught in audits for a very long time
than to perform extremely efficient audits. Similar conclusions can be obtained
if one analyze the effect of changing q for a fixed value of k, as shown in Fig.
5 (d).
After the analysis of the tax evaders’ behavior, a question may arise: what
is the behavior of the other two classes (s = +1 and s = 0)? In particular,
remembering that we are considering a 3-state model instead of an usual 2-
state one, what is the impact of the presence of the third class, the undecided
individuals, in the evolution of the system? In Fig. 6 we exhibit the stationary
fractions of the three classes of agents as functions of the audit probability pa
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Fig. 6. (Color online) Average stationary fractions of evaders (squares), undecided
(circles) and honests (triangles, in the insets) as functions of pa for k = 10 and
typical values of q, namely q = 0.1 (a), q = 0.3 (b), q = 0.5 (c) and q = 0.8
(d). Each point is averaged over 100 independent simulations for population size
N = 104, and the dashed lines are just guides to the eye.
for k = 10 and typical values of q. One can see that, in general, the stationary
fraction of undecided individuals is greater than the stationary fraction of tax
evaders, and the former is always > 10% of the population. The evaders in
the long-time limit are majority in comparison with undecided agents only
for large densities of negative interactions q, like q = 0.8, and pa < 0.7 [see
Fig. 6 (d)]. Even in this case, the honests are the majority in the population.
For increasing values of pa, the fraction of honest agents grows slowly for
q < qc and fastly for q > qc. One can also see from Fig. 6 that when we rise
the fraction of negative interactions q, it is more difficult to control the tax
evasion in the population, as discussed above. Indeed, for q = 0.3 we have a
density of ≈ 10% of tax evaders for pa = 0.2, a value that is only reached for
q = 0.5 and q = 0.8 at pa ≈ 0.7 and pa → 1.0, respectively. This is due to the
high disagreement among the individuals in the population.
Summarizing, one can see that the presence of undecided agents in the pop-
ulation (state s = 0) naturally reduces the number of evaders, and the im-
plementation of public policies for punishment can be effective in controlling
the tax evasion in the population, either due to fear of the undecided to being
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caught in an audit (if he/she become an evader), as by the monitoring of the
tax evaders. This kind of behavior was not observed in the previous studies
on the Zaklan model [13,14,15,16,18].
4 Final remarks
In this work, we have studied the dynamics of tax evasion on a fully-
connected population. Different from the previous studies on the Zaklan econo-
physics model, where the agents can be in two distinct states (s = ±1), the
dynamics of interactions among the agents in our model follows a three-state
(s = +1,−1, 0) kinetic exchange opinion model [20], where individuals inter-
act by pairs with competitive negative (with probability q) and positive (with
probability 1−q) couplings. Furthermore, we have considered the enforcement
rules of the Zaklan model, where each agent is caught by an audit with prob-
ability pa and he/she is punished and remains honest during the following k
periods of time (or time steps).
Below the critical point qc = 1/4 of the opinion model, the dynamics leads the
population to a state where the majority of the agents are honests (s = +1). In
this case, the punishment rules do not affect considerably the system. On the
other hand, for q > qc the kinetic exchange opinion model conducts the system
to a disordered state where the three opinions coexist with equal fractions (1/3
for each one). In this case, we verified that the application of the enforcement
mechanism can considerably reduce the tax evasion in the population. This
reduction increases for decreasing values of q, which means that it is more
difficult to control the compliance in populations with more disagreement
among the individuals, i.e., with a large value of q.
We have also verified that the fraction of undecided or undecided individuals,
i.e., agents with state s = 0, affects the evolution of the tax evasion. These
agents survive in the population in the long-time limit, which favors the re-
duction of the tax evasion. This fact together with the control given by the
public policies may lead to low levels of evasion.
Regarding the critical behavior of the model, that is clearly observed in the
absence of the enforcement rules (i.e., for pa = k = 0), one can easily see from
our numerical results that the application of the punishment rules induces a
decrease of the number of tax evaders (s = −1) in the system, and conse-
quently an increase of the number of honest agents (state s = +1), which
makes the order parameter defined in Eq. (3) always greater than zero, i.e.,
we have no disordered phase in the presence of the enforcement rules (i.e., for
pa > 0 and k > 0).
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As a future work, it can be interesting to analyze how different initial frac-
tions of undecided individuals affect the tax evasion dynamics. In addition,
the effects of agents convictions in the model can also be a realistic feature
to be addressed. This kind of heterogeneity can affect considerably the evolu-
tion of opinion models [21,22,23,24,25], and will certainly affect the dynamics
of tax evasion considered here. Finally, the presence of inflexible agents [26]
may also be important for better understanding of collective decision-making
phenomena as occur in the dynamics of tax evasion.
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